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Rejoinder to Professor Merrill
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1
Professor Merrill, in his forcefully written reply to my article,
gives the impression of responding directly and firmly to the major
objections I raise concerning the application of the Takings Clause to
health care price regulation. In this case, however, appearances are
deceiving.' The main points of my article are that (1) the economic
interests at stake in regulatory takings analysis are indistinguishable
from those the Court has largely declined to protect since the Lochner
era ended, and (2) evaluating the net effects of government action in
the health care sector is likely to greatly complicate the takings inquiry. Merrill never seriously addresses the first concern. His improbable response to the second is to propose individualized public
utility-style ratemaking proceedings at4 the option of each of the
600,000 physicians in the United States.

Remarkably, Merrill suggests that by applying the "reasonable
return" standard to health care price regulation, courts would be applying the Takings Clause "as that Clause has come to be understood
by courts through decades of interpretation."' Although Professor
Merrill is not specific, the group of "courts" to which he refers apparently does not include the Supreme Court of the United States. That
Court has, at least since 1937, uniformly rejected takings claims pre-
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1. Thomas W. Merrill, Reply to ProfessorBrewbaker, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 709

(1994).
2. William S. Brewbaker III, Health Care Price Controls and the Takings Clause, 21
HAsTrnGs CONST. L.Q. 669 (1994).
3. Merrill inveighs, in turn, against (1) process-based constitutional theory, Merrill,
supra note 1, at 710-13, (2) substantive due process, id. at 713-15, (3) my alleged desire to
"doom" takings inquiries from the outset by broadening the scope of regulatory takings
analysis, id.at 715-18, and, finally, (4) the idea (attributed to me) that "the burdens of price
controls should be overlooked because physicians and hospitals can engage in ... 'defensive maneuvers' to mitigate the financial costs of [price] controls." Id. at 718.
4. Id. at 716-17.
5. 1d. at 709.
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mised on price regulation, except when such claims were brought by a
6
public utility.
Finally, Professor Merrill notes "one theme [that] stands out
overall" in my article: "Each of the criticisms leveled by Professor
Brewbaker, even if valid, could also be made about the Supreme
Court's decisions applying the Takings Clause to public utility
ratemaking, or ... to exercises of the power of eminent domain."'
The impossibility of theoretical consistency is, of course, the first feature of regulatory takings doctrine noted in my article.8 It follows that
the line-drawing exercise in which the Court has been engaged in the
regulatory takings field reflects a practical (as opposed to a theoretically consistent) accommodation of the tensions inherent in regulatory
takings doctrine.9 As first noted by Justice Holmes, these tensions are
the need, on one hand, for adequate protection of individuals against
confiscatory government action, and, on the other, government's need
to govern without undue administrative and financial burden. Because (1) the Takings Clause protects some, but not all, economic interests, and (2) the Court has not yet found a theoretically consistent
way of distinguishing between those interests that deserve protection
and those that do not, virtually any argument against compensation in
a particular case will "prove[ ] too much"' 0 in the sense that it could
be used to argue against compensation in some case in which the
Court has reached a contrary result. The same reasoning also applies
to arguments supporting compensation, however, as Professor Merrill's "specific capital" test illustrates. Like my "sweeping equation of
any protection of economic rights with Lochner[, Merrill's test] cannot
be confined to issues involving physician price controls."" As interesting as it is, the "specific capital" theory cannot be limited consistently to price controls and thus would require compensation in a host
of cases where the Court has previously found compensation not to be
due.2'
It is to Professor Merrill's enduring credit that he has managed to
make the argument for Takings Clause review of health care reform
6. See Brewbaker, supra note 2, at 707 (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct.
1522 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)).
7. Merrill, supra note 1, at 709.
8. See Brewbaker, supra note 2, at 672-73.
9. See id. at 672-73, 676.
10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 717.
11. Id. at 715.
12. See Brewbaker, supra note 2, at 697 & n.123.
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legislation, including price controls, sound plausible. However, applying the Takings Clause in the way he proposes would, for practical
purposes, require the Court to tell Congress (and the American people) that Congress may not deal with the nation's perceived health
care crisis in the way it deems best. The Takings Clause has never
been strong enough to carry that sort of message.

